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Abstract We discuss the three dominant models of the phenomenological literature 
pertaining to temporal consciousness, namely the cinematic, the retentional, and the extensional 
model. By relying on the distinction between acts and contents of consciousness we first discuss 
the explanatory merits of these three views vis à vis our temporal experience. In the second part 
of the paper, we review some relevant findings from the psychology and neuroscience of 
temporality in order to evaluate which of the three models of time consciousness is better 
confirmed from an empirical viewpoint. Depending on the time scale, all of the three models 
of temporal consciousness might be justified but we claim that the empirical evidence favours 
the extensional model, where the acts and contents of consciousness are both extended. The 
retentional model might apply to longer time intervals covered by working memory but, 
similarly to the cinematic model, it is open to the objection that from a neurophysiological point 
of view the brain processes which underlie acts of consciousness must necessarily be extended 
in time. We conclude by stressing a so-far neglected predictive component that is to be regarded 
as decisive for an understanding of our experience of temporality.   
 
Keywords Cinematical model ∙ Retentional model ∙ Extensional model ∙ Time 
consciousness ∙ Time perception ∙ Prediction  
 
  
  
- 2 - 
1 Introduction 
In the phenomenological literature on the experience of time it is customary to 
distinguish among three models (Roselli 2019), namely the cinematic model (Chuard 2011, 
Prosser 2016), the retentional model (Grush 2007, Kiverstein 2010, Pelczar 2010) and the 
extensional model (e.g. Dainton 2010a, 2010b, 2011, 2014, Hoerl 2009, 2013).  
In this paper we try to situate the discussion of these three models within an empirical 
framework provided by the cognitive sciences. In particular, our aim is to evaluate whether 
findings in experimental neuropsychology are relevant or can even decide among these 
phenomenological models on an empirical basis, or, alternatively, whether such findings 
suggest a different phenomenological model that has not yet been considered. On the 
philosophical assumption that phenomenological models should not be regarded as autonomous 
from empirical research (Mölder 2014), we will claim that, depending on the time range 
involved, there is empirical evidence for the extensional model, in particular when this model 
is supplemented by an important prospective component which has often been neglected. 
The paper is organized as follows. In its first part, we briefly review the three above-
mentioned models with the purpose of evaluating their explanatory power vis à vis our 
experience of time. In the second part we raise the question whether available empirical data 
may provide independent empirical evidence for one of these explanatory models. This issue 
will be discussed in the second section, where we discuss the empirical findings that we deem 
relevant to defend our main claim, namely that the extensional model seems better confirmed 
by the empirical evidence. In principle, the cinematic and the retentional model might be 
compatible with some relevant empirical data at different time scales: however, since any 
biological process takes time and in any empirical evaluation of the models it is indispensable 
to refer to underlying brain processes, we will conclude that an unextended act of 
consciousness as postulated by the cinematic and well by the retentional model is biologically 
and neurophysiogically implausible. The mechanistic basis of any act of consciousness 
necessitates of an interval of time (Longo & Montévil 2011). 
          An initial motivation to the transition between the first and the second part is that, as a 
general methodological point, theories (in particular when they exemplify an equal degree of 
explanatory force) must be selected on the basis of their evidential strength. And even if we 
were in the position to conclude that a theory M explains the phenomenological data better 
than another theory M’, it may still be the case that M’ has more evidential empirical support: 
the world need not be simple or accountable by few powerful hypotheses. In the final section, 
we draw some general lessons on the relationship between phenomenological analyses of time 
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consciousness and empirical sources of knowledge. The methodological approach that we 
favor can be summarized by adapting to our case the famous Kantian slogan: empirical data 
without phenomenological guidance are blind, but phenomenology without empirical 
evidence is empty.1 Obviously, this paper does not have the ambition to provide a final model 
of how the brain creates temporal experience and how this relates to phenomenological 
models of our temporal consciousness. Its interest, we submit, lies in the fact that, to our 
knowledge at least, only few attempts have been made to juxtapose insights from psychology 
and neuroscience with phenomenological models of our temporal experience. 
 
2 Three models of temporal consciousness 
In order to introduce the main three phenomenological models of time consciousness, it is 
useful to disentangle various terminological and conceptual questions that are relevant to 
characterize them. At least initially, it is useful to distinguish between the act of consciousness 
and what is represented by the act, its phenomenal content. Dainton spells out this distinction 
in terms of awareness and consciousness: “when we are conscious of a sound, we are aware of 
it: consciousness consists of an awareness of phenomenal contents: items such as sounds, colors, 
bodily sensations, thoughts and so on. Hence there is a distinction between phenomenal 
contents and acts of awareness.” (Dainton, 2010a, p. 108; emphasis in the original). At this 
point two remarks are in order. In what follows, and by cutting short a lot of very difficult and 
complicated matters, we will follow Dainton by assuming that conscious states having as their 
content phenomena like change or motion are simply constituted by our awareness of them, in 
the sense that acts of awareness are a condition of possibility for having phenomenal content.2 
The second remark is that while Dainton’s quotation seems to presuppose a sense-data theory 
of perception, in which, as BonJour (2002, p. 122) has it, “the nature of immediate experience 
is accounted for by postulating both an act of awareness (or apprehension) and an object (the 
sense-datum) which that act apprehends or is an awareness of” (2002, p. 122). Here we will 
ignore this difficult question, namely, whether we are aware directly of properties of physical 
objects and events, including the temporal relations they exemplify – direct realism – or whether 
we represent a mind-independent physical world from certain unavoidable “perspectives” – 
indirect realism. 
                                                 
1 This slogan of course takes into due consideration the fact that phenomenological analyses in general cannot 
easily be regarded as based on purely a priori knowledge. After all, such analyses have as material the intentional 
content of our mental states. However, they can be regarded a priori in the sense that they bracket any data coming 
from physical time and mental time. 
2 Of course, we can perceive the tick-tack of an alarm clock without being aware of it, that is, without paying our 
conscious attention to it. But unconscious perceptions of these kinds will be simply left out of our paper. 
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On this preliminary basis, and by taking for granted Dainton’s distinction between acts and 
their phenomenal contents, in the literature it is customary to distinguish among three possible 
models of our experience of time, the cinematic, the retentional and the extensional model, all 
of them dependent on the aforementioned distinction between act and content. As a 
consequence, we can consistently distinguish among three different models of time experience: 
(i) Either both the conscious act and the content of consciousness are temporally unextended or 
“instantaneous” 3, a view that is often referred to as the cinematic model, to which we will refer 
as (M1) or (ii) the act is instantaneous but the content is not – this model is referred to as the 
retentional model (M2); or (iii) both the act and the content have some finite duration (the 
extensional model or M3). These models are listed in the first three rows of Table 1. In the 
fourth row, we added for completeness another possible model that is not contemplated in the 
literature, namely what we label the antiretentional model M4.  
 
Insert Table 1 about here 
 
Table 1. Phenomenological models of temporal consciousness characterized by acts and 
contents of consciousness as unextended or extended. The three models typically discussed 
are marked in bold. 
 
Models of temporal consciousness 
 
Conscious Act Content of the act 
Cinematic Model (M1) Temporally Unextended Temporally Unextended 
Retentional Model (M2) Temporally Unextended Temporally Extended 
Extensional Model (M3) Temporally Extended Temporally Extended 
Antiretentional Model (M4) Temporally Extended Temporally Unextended  
 
Given that in this section our purpose is only to evaluate their explanatory power vis a 
vis our temporal experience, our presentation of these models can afford to be brief. In particular, 
we will be invoking what philosophers call an inference to the best explanation which might 
allow us to conclude that we ought to favour the model(s) with the highest explanatory power, 
                                                 
3 We choose the label “temporally unextended” in order to contrast it sharply with “temporally extended”. In some 
cases, in the literature, “temporally unextended” in our context is spelled out in terms of “momentary (or extremely 
brief) states of consciousness” (Dainton 2011, p. 395), or in terms of states lacking any significant temporal 
extension (Dainton 2010a). Therefore, in what follows, and for the sake of clarity, we will treat any mention of 
“momentary” literally, and therefore as co-extensional with strictly unextended. Otherwise, given the vagueness 
of ‘significant’ referring to ‘extension’, we would water down the distinction between our models, unless we could 
devise an empirically established threshold above which we can say that the content or the act are “significantly” 
extended. 
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where “highest” is determined by epistemic considerations involving the best balance between 
simplicity and scope of the explanation.  
The cinematic model ought to explain the perception of continuous change and motion in 
our sensory field by supposing that at a fundamental level there is a rapid succession of 
temporally unextended contents registered by momentary acts of consciousness. How can an 
instantaneous content of our experience generate an experience of continuous passage? Is such 
an experience illusory? The explanatory task raised by this model would then consist in 
showing how the seamlessly changing contents of our temporal experience, –similar to 
snapshots or static frames of a movie, are fused together thanks to acts of consciousness each 
of which are themselves instantaneous. In a word, the cinematic model must suppose that a 
whole sequence of unextended phenomenal snapshots can in principle be explained by a 
corresponding series of momentary acts of awareness, in such a way as to generate the 
impression of a continuous succession or change in the content of momentary acts.  
The second model present in the table above is the retentional model, which is based on 
the hypothesis that the immediate past is “retained” within an instantaneous act of 
consciousness, so that we are directly aware of a finitely extended temporal interval, within 
which retentions and retentions of retentions generate an impression of continuous motion and 
change. To exemplify, imagine a simplified model of an information gathering and utilizing 
system (IGUS as Hartle, 2005, originally named them) with a finite number of memory registers 
(for simplicity, say four, P1, P2, P3, P4), which are successively occupied by new experiences 
of present events.4 Suppose the first present experience is in P1. With the passage of time P2 is 
experienced in the present, but the content of P1 is retained in P2 with some continuity. When 
P3 is in its turn experienced in the present, the memory of P2 is retained in P3’s register, but 
since within a certain duration on which we will expand later P2 still contains the memory 
contained in P1, the contents of the latter register are still affecting the present experience 
contained in P3. Finally, when P4 is experienced, P3 is retained together with its memory 
contents P2 and P1. In the meantime, the organism experiences new events with the same 
registers and the memory contained in P4 fades even more.5  
The third, the extensional model, attributes a finite duration to both the acts and the contents 
of consciousness. Consequently, if, as Husserl had it, “the perception of a temporal object itself 
                                                 
4 Here we have slightly modified Hartle’s model by stressing the element of the fading of retained experiences. 
Callender (2017, ch.11) uses IGUSs to explain our feeling of the passage of time without assuming its reality. 
5 Clearly, the succession of experiences is kept together or integrated by the fact that this nested information is 
stored by the same subject. See below. 
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has temporality”6, and if perception of temporality does not consist only in a perception of its 
duration but also possesses a structural order of succession, according to M3 the relation “earlier 
than” holding between the temporally extended content of the acts of consciousness is typically 
the same relation as that holding between the temporally separated acts. That is, events in the 
world unfold in time and our experience of them generally mirrors this temporal unfolding 
(Phillips 2014). Despite experimentally accessible distortions in the milliseconds range leading 
to temporal illusions and to the feeling of a smooth flow of events (Dennett and Kinsbourne 
1992, Gruber et al. 2015, Power 2011), in the vast majority of cases the temporal order of the 
phenomenal contents is reflected in the temporal order of the acts of awareness. 
It must be noted that an evaluation of all of these models very soon generates a choice 
between two different approaches. The three models in fact are either three alternative, rival 
and as-accurate-as-possible descriptions of the way in which we seem to experience time or 
they are to be conceived as different and incompatible explanations of this very temporal 
experience, or why we experience time the way we do. And even though explanations are 
particular kinds of descriptions, their nature is clearly characterized by an attempt of making us 
understand something that we take to be a fact. In this section, we will opt for the second option, 
without forgetting the simple point that in order to explain x, we must know exactly what x is. 
If our task were to describe as faithfully as possible the phenomenology of our untutored time 
consciousness, it would be extremely controversial to hold that we have a privileged access to 
our temporal experience. 7  In what follows, therefore, we will briefly assess in turn the 
explanatory merits of the three models on the assumption that one or the other is the correct 
phenomenological account of our experience of time. We will show that even the cinematic 
model, intuitively the most remote from our experience, can offer some explanation of the way 
time appears to us. 
From an explanatory viewpoint, in fact, the retentional and the extentional models seem to 
exemplify the virtue of explanatory power and faithfulness to our experience of time to a greater 
                                                 
6 While Husserl is typically regarded as retentionalist, in some passages he seems to defend an extensionalist 
model: “it is evident that the perception of a temporal object itself has temporality, that the perception of duration 
itself presupposes the duration of perception, that the perception of any temporal form itself has the 
phenomenological temporality that belongs to its irreducible essence” (Husserl 1928/1991, p.24). As a matter of 
fact, Husserl’s name is often associated with the retentional model. However, in the Husserlian tradition it does 
not make sense to try to measure the duration of an act of awareness, or of its content. According to Husserl in 
fact, the structure of retentions, experience and protentions is abstract in the sense of being a condition of possibility 
for our temporal experience. From this perspective, according to Husserl, the distinction between act and content 
is not well-posed. By endorsing this remark, we limit our attention to the philosophical or phenomenological 
discussions of the retentional model that do not faithfully follow Husserl and that engage themselves with the 
durational aspect of our temporal experience. Thanks to one of the referees for having suggested to make this point. 
7 There is a vast literature on this problem. For skepticism about the transparency of first knowledge access to 
intentional states, see Gopnik (1995). 
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degree, because the perception of change seems to require a temporally extended content of our 
mental acts. In fact, M1 needs to postulate some hidden mechanism (in analogy with the 24 
frames per second frequency needed in movies to generate visual continuity) in order to explain 
why, when we perceive motion, the contents of our temporal experience seem continuously 
changing even if, strictly speaking, they do not, because they are instantaneous. For instance, 
the fact that the very brief temporal integration mechanisms realized by our brain at very short 
scales are nevertheless extended in time may explain both why the resulting content of our 
perception is instantaneous and why we experience a continuity of motion in spite of this 
unextendedness in time.   
A second, more phenomenological explanation, could be given in terms of the well-known 
color phi illusion, which has been used by Le Poidevin (2007) and Paul (2010) to claim that we 
can experience motion between two static spots of different colors that quickly blink in 
succession without any motion of the spots. An analogous mechanism leading to the waterfall 
illusion – an experience of motion without an object actually moving – has been considered by 
Prosser (2016) and Arstila (2017), who discuss these findings within the framework of a 
dynamic snapshot view.  
While for a critical evaluation of these two cases we refer the reader to Callender (2017, 
pp. 239-240), in our context it is sufficient to stress that the cinematic model must regard all of 
the contents of our perceiving acts as being of a similar nature, namely as something that is 
intrinsically static (say, the position of a flying arrow), but “animated” by us in such a way that 
their motion looks continuous. An explanation of this feature, which is certainly possible, looks 
rather complicated at the phenomenological level, which seems to point in the opposite 
direction, and this counts as a prima facie but only apparent difficulty of this model vis à vis 
the other two. 
Agreed, M2 and M3 can explain our experience of change simply by assuming that the 
contents of our acts are themselves extended in time and that, therefore, must have a duration. 
In fact, any entity that is temporally unextended, like the contents of the static snapshots of the 
cinematic model, cannot change by definition, at least under the common conception of change. 
Such a conception entails the identity across time of whatever changes in the contents of our 
acts, call it E, and the fact that at different moments of time the same E exemplifies two 
incompatible properties, like occupying in a continuous way different locations against a fixed 
background. This cannot be the case for the temporally unextended contents typical of M1, since 
each of them is different from any other one and nothing unextended can change. 
The cinematic theorist, however, can rebut this objection in at least two ways.  
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First, she can construe change and motion as the occupation of different locations at different 
times. This explanation is not absurd of course, as it corresponds to the solution given by 
Russell to the arrow paradox in the so called “at-at theory of motion” (Salmon 1977). So even 
in the epistemically more solid field of physics and the metaphysics of physics change can be 
regarded as a relation between a location and a time, in which the arrow is at rest at all instants 
of time. Given this metaphysical underpinning of change, an explanation of our seamless 
temporal experience is not logically impossible. 
Second, along with Prosser, the cinematic theorist can distinguish between a static 
cinematic model and a dynamic one (the dynamic snapshot view discussed in Prosser 2016),8 
the latter corresponding to the thesis that our experiences may have an instantaneous content 
including a “vector rate of change” (Prosser 2016, 123). In this hypothesis, the dynamic 
snapshot theorist can claim to be able to experience change without any temporal extendedness 
(of either act or content). Consequently, M2 and M3 would have no explanatory advantage over 
M1, since in order to perceive change we would not need a temporally extended content 
belonging to a “specious present”.  
Furthermore, even if, from a conceptual point of view, change, modulo the remarks below, 
could be experienced directly only if the contents of our perception belong to a temporal 
window of a finite non-instantaneous duration, the question whether this extendedness applies 
both to the content and the act, or just to the content would still be difficult to evaluate and 
might be decided only if looked at empirical data coming from neuroscience and psychology. 
As a general methodological point and ceteris paribus, we are often told that if we apply 
Occam’s razor to theories having the same empirical consequences but obtained in virtue of 
incompatible explanatory assumptions, we ought to prefer the simpler explanation, and 
therefore, prima facie, in our case the second and third model. However, why should we prefer 
simpler explanations? Lacking a clear analysis of what “simple” means (at least in our context), 
how should we proceed? Retentionalism, for example, is not so “simple”, since it may have to 
include the notion of “the temporal modes of presentation”. An extensionalist like Dainton, in 
turn, relies on notions such as co-consciousness, the unity of consciousness and an inherent 
dynamism of the specious present. All of these features are hard to make sense of and, possibly, 
it is for this reason that Dainton regards them as fundamental and irreducible.9 In the end, 
various reasons can be adduced that suggest a comparison of the phenomenological literature 
with relevant empirical findings. 
                                                 
8 See also Dorato (2019). 
9 We thank an anonymous referee for these important remarks. 
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First, even if were true that from a conceptual point of view change, modulo the remarks 
above, could be experienced directly only if the contents of our perception belonged to a 
temporal window of a finite non-instantaneous duration, the question whether this extendedness 
applies both to the content and the act, or just to the content would be difficult to evaluate and 
might be decided only if looked at empirical data coming from psychology and 
neurophysiology, something that we will do in the following sections. 
Second, we have seen why an appeal to explanatory virtues and faithfulness cannot cut ice, 
since all models can formulate an explanation as of why we perceive, say, continuous change. 
We should try to overcome the stalemate by invoking empirical considerations. 
Third, if the acts of consciousness necessary for perceiving temporal relations can be 
distinguished from what is represented by them (their content), it could be argued that the three 
models are not exhaustive. Then, one may want to consider a fourth possible option, suggested 
by merely combinatory reasons: we could have temporally extended acts of consciousness 
whose content is however temporally unextended, a possibility that, as far as we know, in the 
literature has not been discussed. In Table 1 this fourth model is labeled anti-retentionalist (M4).  
In a word, we hope that this section has persuaded the reader that the difficulty of choosing 
among these models only on the basis of their explanatory value suggests a different strategy, 
based on empirical research. Even if we were to conclude that empirical research cannot solve 
the dispute between these models, the negative result would still be relevant in order to judge 
the epistemological status of purely phenomenological discussions, which, at the current level 
of knowledge, would have to be regarded as wholly underdetermined by empirical data. This 
by itself should not be interpreted as a criticism of phenomenological approaches, given that 
the under-determination of scientific theories by data is considered by many philosophers to be 
an unavoidable feature of our knowledge of the world (even in the empirically most robust 
empirical science, physics). In another sense, if a comparison with the psychological research 
that we will present in the remainder of the paper were to prove unhelpful, we could interpret 
our conclusion as a further evidence in favor of Prosser’s (2016) skeptical view that a decision 
among these three models is impossible, since it presupposes a “Cartesian Theater” account of 
consciousness that has been famously attacked by Daniel Dennett (1992). According to Dennett, 
this wrongheaded account regards experiences as inner pictures in front of which the subject 
sits as if she were watching a show. 
 
3 Temporal-mechanisms: empirical evidence 
There are many different neurophysiological and psychological conceptualizations 
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regarding temporal-processing mechanisms, which make it difficult to juxtapose naively one 
empirically-based model with the above phenomenological models of temporal experience.10 
However, different empirical lines of evidence may be summoned that show commonalities, 
that is, principal mechanisms and effects, which can be related to important conceptual aspects 
of the phenomenological models under question.  
Before briefly presenting a selection of the relevant empirical literature, we deem it 
appropriate to anticipate our conclusion, which is that the extensional model seems to be better 
confirmed by findings in the neuroscience.11 It pertains to the duration of up to a few seconds, 
the experienced moment. The cinematic model could instead potentially apply to the very short 
time range of milliseconds, but to our knowledge so far there is no convincing empirical 
evidence in its favour. The retentional model might also apply, as it may be more adequate for 
temporal perception of longer intervals that are not experienced within the present moment but 
require working memory capacities. To these models we add and make explicit a strong 
“prospective” component, meaning that the act of consciousness is directional in the sense of 
being anticipatory.  
 
3.1 Perception of temporal order and temporal integration 
In order to prepare the ground for comparing the philosophical models with relevant 
empirical data, we should begin with the elementary perception of temporal succession. In this 
respect, one has to differentiate between the perception of temporal separated-ness (of non-
simultaneity) and the perception of temporal order (Pöppel 1997, Vatakis et al. 2008). The 
importance of this distinction for our problem lies in the fact that while in the former case a 
time asymmetric order of causation cannot play any role (no temporal order is perceived), the 
latter raises the issue of the possible dependence of the temporal order on the causal order. In 
experiments assessing thresholds for the perception of non-simultaneity versus simultaneity, 
temporal resolution depends on the sensory system involved, the lowest threshold of detection 
being observed in the auditory modality is within 2 to 3 milliseconds (ms) (Lacker and Teuber 
1973, Lotze et al. 1999); the tactile and visual system have higher thresholds, in the range of 
tens of milliseconds (Elliott et al. 2007, Giersch et al. 2013, Kirman 1974, Poggel et al. 2013). 
The perception of non-simultaneity, however, does not imply the capacity of detecting the 
temporal order of the two events, that is, which of two events appeared before the other. This 
                                                 
10 For an attempt in this direction, see Gallagher and Zahavi (2008) with their reference to the theory of dynamical 
systems. For an interesting review of another aspect connecting phenomenology and neuroscience, see Holcombe 
(2015). 
11 Excepting the anti-retentional model, for which no empirical evidence can be provided. 
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capacity of temporally ordering auditory, tactile or visual stimuli has higher thresholds 
(Babkoff and Fostick 2013, Pöppel 1997). Many studies have shown how the perception of 
temporal order of two short events in different sensory modalities is only possible when the 
events are separated by temporal intervals of about 20 to 60 ms (e.g. Exner 1875, Fink et al. 
2006, Hirsh and Sherrick 1961, Szymaszek et al. 2009). Below the threshold for detection of 
non-simultaneity, two events objectively separated by a few milliseconds are nevertheless 
perceived as happening at the same time, while below the correct temporal-order threshold 
stimuli might be perceived as non-simultaneous but their true order cannot be reliably detected.  
When multisensory information of longer duration is presented, inter-stimulus intervals 
of up to 100 to 200 ms may have to occur before an observer is able to distinguish the 
asynchrony, i.e., the fact that the visual and auditory stimuli were not presented at the same 
time (van Wassenhove 2009, Vatakis and Spence 2007). Related conceptualizations have 
focused on temporal integration mechanisms that are bound to neural system states defining a 
‘perceptual moment’ (e.g. Elliott and Giersch 2016, Pöppel 1997, Stroud 1955, White 2018). 
Whatever underlying mechanism is assumed, it has been difficult to empirically validate 
underlying models of temporal-order detection and of the constitution of the experienced 
moment (Madl et al. 2016, Ulrich 1987, Yarrow and Arnold 2016). Nevertheless, the temporal 
order threshold is the smallest interval at which two events have a clear temporal relation of 
precedence. The conscious experience of sequence are based on this elementary temporal 
relation between two events to be judged as “A occurs before B” (Wackermann 2008) 12 . 
Perceiving the temporal order of events is thereafter fundamental for understanding the causal 
structure of the world; it has been shown that the ability to detect the temporal order of events 
(accurateness in temporal-order detection) is a stable trait in humans (Grabot and van 
Wassenhove 2017). What these authors take for granted is that the temporal order of events 
grounds the causal order, but more work should be devoted to clarify the possibility that the 
reverse order of dependence is the case: namely, that the temporal order of events depends on 
our primitive ability to perceive causal relations between them. From Kant onward, these 
theories, falling under the label causal theories of time, stress the role of memory in establishing 
the temporal order of events (see, for instance, Mellor 1998): to the extent that a memory trace 
is an effect of a previous experience (its cause), causal relations allow us to establish the 
                                                 
12 Recent empirical evidence suggests that visual temporal-order processing may also happen on an 
unconscious level below the temporal-order threshold; that is, on an implicit behavioral level one can show how 
temporal-order information is processed albeit not consciously detected (Elliott & Giersch 2016). Importantly, this 
unconscious coding of temporal ordering has been discussed as creating the feeling of the continuous passage of 
time (Herzog et al. 2016). See before our comments about the voluntariness of acts unifying temporal successions. 
  
- 12 - 
temporal order of events and not just when multisensory information is involved. In other words, 
the relation of temporal succession depends on a primitively conceived causally asymmetric 
relation. In this perspective, and for all models under discussion we could be aware of an order 
of temporality only due to intervention of working memory, which would then play a pivotal 
role in our perception of time: I could not be aware that a sound is before a light signal if I 
didn’t remember the first event while perceiving the second.  
In evaluating the above models, let us note that from the neurophysiological perspective, 
the objective physical time (duration) that is necessary for our brain to produce a single, 
subjective experience of succession is finite and not infinitesimal, a fact that is obviously non-
controversial. What is controversial, however, is whether this fact is sufficient to rule out the 
cinematic model in the form of the dynamical snapshot model (according to which “experience 
has an instantaneous model that includes vector rate of change”, Prosser 2016, 123). The color 
phi or the waterfall illusions are probably based on neuronal mechanisms operating in the 
millisecond time range (Arstila 2017, Paul 2010, Le Poidevin 2007). It has therefore been 
argued that for these illusions a dynamic version of a cinematic snapshot model could hold 
(Arstila 2017, Prosser 2016). We argue that such a mechanism is possible for a special case of 
experimentally-induced illusions in the very short time range of neurophysiological integration. 
To come back to the analysis of temporal-order perception, empirical evidence for these 
“threshold phenomena” points to discrete processing steps in perception on different temporal 
scales. Below the temporal order threshold two events are treated as co-temporal. Although 
they might appear non-simultaneous, their temporal order cannot be reliably indicated. Thus, 
such a temporal-order threshold defines a ‘functional moment’ of integration with some tens or 
hundreds of millisecond duration (Wittmann 2011). Also in sensorimotor processing tasks, a 
temporal border of around 300 ms is delineated when subjects are instructed to tap with a finger 
consecutively on a button. Only with tapping intervals longer than ca. 300 ms are subjects able 
to sequentially distinguish and temporally control each individual finger tap (Peters 1989, 
Wittmann et al. 2001). These and many other studies show how sequentially evolving events 
are temporally integrated in discrete windows or processing cycles (for overviews, see Elliott 
and Giersch 2016, Pöppel 1997, van Wassenhove 2009, Wittmann 2011, 2016). Overall, 
temporal integration of stimuli with sub-second duration happens over several different time 
scales from a few hundreds to a few tens of milliseconds (White 2018) and depends on the 
phases of oscillations with different frequency bands (Ronconi et al. 2017). These oscillations 
have, for example, an active role in parsing the acoustic stream in speech and music in at least 
two different temporal windows, in segments of around 30 ms (gamma band) as well as around 
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200 ms (theta band) (Giraud and Poeppel 2012, Teng et al. 2017). These two timescales of 
around 30 ms and 200 ms are detectable in various experimental outcomes revealing two groups 
of temporal visual processing mechanisms. These mechanisms have the purpose of extracting 
perceptual qualities that work in unison to establish a unified visual experience (Holcombe 
2009). 
It is on the time scale of around 300 ms that Dainton (2008) identifies the duration of 
the extensional present: “Tap a table with your fingers, at regular intervals of about a second; 
after each new tap, ask yourself if you can still hear its immediate predecessors. If the span of 
your auditory specious present is anything like mine, the answer will be ‘no’.” (Dainton 2008, 
367). Dainton’s example of the extended present thereafter relates to a temporally unified whole 
defined by the experienced fusion of perceived elements, in his example a sequence of auditory 
events produced by finger taps on a table. Following from the functional analysis of sensory 
thresholds, this specious present is a functional moment of event integration spanning duration 
of around 300 ms. Dainton’s view stems from the intuition that for two events to be experienced 
within the same extended present they should have the same “phenomenal force”. The sensory 
impression of an event happening a second ago is less strong and therefore outside the window 
of the perceptual now. We concur with this view, as it is indicative of an extended perceptual 
moment that we label “the functional moment” in the range of milliseconds or less than a second. 
This is striking evidence that, at this time scale, Dainton’s extensional model as he presents it 
from a purely phenomenological viewpoint, is confirmed. According to Dainton, this functional 
moment of integration identified to last some hundreds of milliseconds would define the 
extended present moment. 
 
3.2 The timing of acts and contents of consciousness 
Dainton’s claim that the act is extended as in the extensional model can be confirmed 
also by psychological experiments related to the attentional blink effect in visual perception. If 
subjects have to search for two target letters presented sequentially in between distractor letters, 
target letter no. 2 can only be detected after an interval of 200 to 400 ms following the 
appearance of target letter no. 1 (Marois and Ivanoff 2005, Ward et al. 1996). The act of 
awareness towards a second content in this specific case is possible only after a certain period 
of time has gone by, i.e. a process for detecting event 2 can be instantiated only when the first 
underlying process responsible for detecting event 1 has ceased. It should be clear why this 
finding is important for our distinction between act and content. The discreteness of the brain’s 
processing mechanism lasting some tens or some hundreds of milliseconds can be seen as 
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indicative of a certain duration of the act of awareness. The attentional system would open up 
for a new input in an oscillatory way with a periodicity lasting duration d, i.e. from 200 to 400 
ms. After a period d a new window opens up for detecting a following stimulus, forming the 
building blocks or correlates of an extended act of awareness. 
Cinematic theorists, however, could object to the claim that acts of consciousness have 
duration. First, they could maintain that the inter-stimulus interval d ranging from 200 to 400 
ms, necessary for detecting target letter no. 2, does not reflect an extended act of consciousness 
lasting for d. A near instantaneous act A1 could open up for target no. 1 (E1, P1) and only after 
d has elapsed an act A2 opens near instantaneously for target no. 2 (E2, P2).  
However, there are various objections to this criticism.  
1. This seemingly plausible mechanism accounting for an unextended conscious act 
would only function in a physical world with fixed periodicities in the milliseconds-
to-seconds range, when an act opens up for anticipated, regularly appearing, 
physical events such as in laboratory tasks designed by experimental psychologists, 
who program a stimulus to appear exactly every 300 ms. In a real-world scenario 
instead, temporally extended acts of consciousness (actually the neural correlates of 
such acts) are necessary in order not to miss events that do not occur exactly 
regularly but with a jitter. Alternatively, one could imagine a series of unextended 
conscious acts through which incoming new information is gathered at a high 
frequency. That would be the equivalent to a film camera which operates with one 
single, stable frequency. Then, however, one would have to assume an additional 
mechanism for explaining why only after a certain number of such acts, after around 
300 ms, the second target can be identified. It has to be emphasized that whereas the 
above-mentioned researchers point to the specificity of certain time ranges for 
cognitive functions, we claim that temporal integration has to be more flexibly 
adjusted according to different processing demands. That is, regular, temporally 
rigid, time frames would be not flexible enough for capturing the statistical 
properties of the world (White, 2018). A conceptual compromise between these two 
viewpoints (the rigid and the flexible) would consist in accepting the empirically 
found time-frames in the millisecond range referred to above but allowing for a 
greater temporal flexibility of these biological mechanisms working in an 
approximate time range.  
2. Furthermore, the cinematic theorist could argue that in a strictly-controlled 
sensorimotor system such as that of internally generated eye movements, the notion 
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of a fixed temporal sequence of near instantaneous acts would seem more plausible. 
The system “knows” when and where it should look. But even as far this second 
criticism is concerned, eye fixations have certain duration of fractions of a second. 
Metaphorically speaking, this system functions not unlike a windscreen wiper which 
shortly clears the windscreen and then rests for a certain period of time (the eye 
fixation period) before clearing the window again (the saccade). Antagonistic 
processing models of magnocellular (M system) and parvocellular (P system) 
pathways underlying the control of eye fixations and saccades comes close to this 
metaphor, where the fast P system would interrupt the processing of the slower M 
system and thereby would enable the intake of novel visual information for a certain 
duration (Breitmayer 1980). Empirical data show how comparably stable durations 
of eye fixations for information intake, alternating with saccades (quick eye 
movements), are found depending on underlying preattentive (150 to 250 ms) and 
attentive (around 500 ms) processing mechanisms (Velichkovsky et al. 2002). 
 
Furthermore, as an additional evidence in favor of the extensional model, the general 
rhythmic nature of local and global neural activity with multiple frequencies, as recorded with 
the electro-or magneto-encephalogram (Buzsáki 2006), is supportive of oscillatory neural 
models underlying discrete information processing in the brain (van Wassenhove 2009, 2017), 
a capacity that can be more plausibly interpreted in the context of extended acts of awareness. 
For example, visual sensory input is most accurately detected when a stimulus appears at a 
certain phase of recorded oscillations with a period of 7 to 10 Hz (Busch and VanRullen 2010, 
2014). This means that the detection ability decreases from a maximally sensitive phase in a 
given oscillatory cycle, before following a trough it increases again to complete the period. This 
ability does not work in an absolute “on” (for a near-instantaneous moment) and “off”-mode, 
but the detection probability is described mathematically as oscillatory. It could be argued that 
this oscillatory processing in the 7-Hz range as assessed with EEG is related to the likelihood 
of a stimulus to be consciously perceived (Busch and van Rullen 2014).  
Not only are the acts of conscious awareness extended, as a consequence of their being 
bound to oscillatory neural mechanisms, but also the conscious contents of these acts are 
extended. This is due to the persistence of objects in the field of perception as static or moving. 
The macroscopic world, including its embodied perceiver, is made predominantly by more or 
less solid objects which change their properties not observably or too slowly (Butterfield 1984). 
Within our present experience we may sense the slowly moving clouds above the static 
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mountain scenery in front of a (static) blue sky. As smooth as the movement of the clouds may 
appear in the otherwise static scenery, the underlying oscillatory neural machinery processes 
the sensory information in discrete ways (van Rullen and Koch 2003, Wittmann 2016). 
Even shortly lasting objects in the field of perception in the range of tens of milliseconds 
can persist much longer as representational entities than their physical counterparts. For 
example, the now classic Sperling experiments concerning the concept of sensory storage have 
revealed how sensory information is stored for a duration that lasts longer than the actual 
stimulus duration (Sperling 1960). When subjects are presented with an overload of acoustic or 
visual stimuli (typically one on several lines of letters or acoustic information from one of 
several sound sources), only those items can be memorized to which attention is directed. When 
a cue is presented shortly after stimulus exposure, indicating which stimuli have to be reported, 
subjects report the presented information from that line or the sound source. This sensory 
storage function is termed iconic (visual modality) and echoic (auditory modality) memory 
(Darwin et al. 1972, Sperling 1960). Letters or syllables with an experimentally controlled 
exposure time of only 50 ms are present in this sensory storage for up to several hundred 
milliseconds – depending upon physical characteristics – before information is lost, if attention 
is not directed to the specific location. That is, short events in the milliseconds range presented 
in the visual or acoustic field do not decay immediately after offset of appearance but are still 
represented for a short while, although they – physically speaking – have vanished.13 Notice 
that this phenomenon is not just to be interpreted as a lag or a delay of our becoming aware of 
a stimulus that just occurred, but it is rather about the duration of contents of sensory stimulation 
that become conscious if attention is directed towards the information they convey. To sum up 
these thoughts, the contents of consciousness are extended as persisting static or dynamic 
elements in our perceptual field and very short-lived stimuli persist longer than the physical 
stimuli on a pre-conscious representational level.  
 
3.3 Temporal windows of presence 
Besides the above-presented lower-level limiting factor of temporal resolution, the 
                                                 
13 These data have interesting consequences also from the point of view of the thorny problem of the 
relation between bodily states and mental states, which here must be left aside. For instance, an identity theory 
between mental and brain events seem to favor the extensional models. In fact, the unmatched temporal properties 
of the neural/physical events and the mental events (the former temporally extended, the latter unextended) may 
seem to render rather implausible the models M1 M2 and M4. If the brain events involved in the perception of 
succession are temporally extended, the mental events to which these brain events are token or type identical are 
temporally extended as well. Since the cinematic and the retentional model assume that the mental act is 
durationless while the content is not and the reverse hold for M4, an identity theorist should favor the other two 
models. 
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temporal-order threshold, which defines the interval below which two events are treated as co-
temporal, and above which the elementary temporal relation between two events is perceived, 
is there also an upper limit of temporal experience? The perception of clock-hand movements 
of a mechanical clock, a thought experiment introduced by C.D. Broad, reveals an upper limit 
of temporal perception (Hoerl 2009, 2013, Kiverstein 2010, Wittmann 2016). We are able to 
see the second hand of the clock move, but we do not see the movement of the hour hand. Even 
if the movement of the hour hand is mechanically constructed such that it moves continuously, 
its movement cannot be perceived because it is too slow for us (our perceptual system). This 
fact indicates that there exists an upper limit of temporal experience.  
The two limiting temporal factors of perception lead to the suggestion of a window of 
presence within which we are able to detect change. The two aspects of consciousness of (1) 
perception of change and (2) the awareness of a present moment are thus intertwined 
(Metzinger 2004). We can only detect change (i.e. the movement of the second hand) when 
perceptual experiences cover a sufficiently extended interval of time in which these changing 
events happen. Accordingly, as William James (1890) had already realized more than a century 
ago without relying on precise experimental measurements, present experience is not a 
durationless instant in time but is embedded in a temporal field that is stretched in time. 
Succession, rhythmic grouping and motion can constitute our experience only in virtue of the 
extended temporal window of presence (Stern 1897). Husserl (1928/1991), Kiverstein (2010), 
and Lloyd (2012) also agree that the content of our experience is stretched in time. Within this 
extended present moment our experience exemplifies a complex temporal structure, the parts 
of which are temporally ordered (Kiverstein and Arstila 2013), such as when one hears the tick-
tock of a clock or when one rhythmically groups musical beats into auditory temporal gestalts 
of 1-2-3, 1-2-3, etc. (Szelag et al. 1996, Linares et al. 2019). 
In case of the hour hand, the subjective present is temporally not extended enough for the 
slow changes to be experienced. Hoerl (2009) thus summarizes that “temporal experience has 
an upper and a lower limit, in the sense that only temporal phenomena that are discriminable 
within these limits (i.e., that don’t happen too fast or too slow) can be perceived. These limits 
[…] reflect empirical, and empirically demonstrable, limitations of our perceptual systems, and 
are to be explained on the level of information-processing psychology.” (Hoerl 2009, 11) 
Experience of change thereafter is defined by the upper and lower boundaries of temporal 
perception: what is being experienced as change unfolds in the extended present. The question 
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then arises: does it make sense to ask how long is the present moment?14 Can a temporally 
extended interval of present-ness be experienced via a momentary act? An answer to these 
questions will prove relevant to our aim of evaluating the different phenomenological models 
on an empirical basis. 
By relying on earlier conceptual and empirical work (e.g. Fraisse 1984, Montemayor 2013, 
Montemayor and Wittmann 2014, Pöppel 1997, Varela 1999) one can argue for at least two 
levels of extended present, one in the range of a few seconds, the experienced moment, which 
is related to temporal segmentation in perception and action, and the other in the range of 
multiple seconds, mental presence, which generates the continuity of experience through 
working-memory processes.  
The experienced moment is a perceptual whole of immediate sensory experience of what 
is perceived ‘now’: the movement of the second hand on the clock face, the musical phrase 
emanating from the radio, the warm feeling of the hot water as I sink into the bath tub. This 
experienced moment fits the extentionalist model, where we experience change happening in a 
certain order of succession that mirrors the unfolding of physical events in the world and 
therefore their order of succession. The “naïve view”, where there is a correspondence between 
the unfolding of experienced events and the unfolding of events in the world (Phillips 2014), 
therefore, is accurate within the temporal limits of the experienced moment. Some experimental 
studies show how an integration window of 2 to 3 seconds duration underlies the perception of 
complex, naturalistic visual sequences (Fairhall et al. 2014). Moreover, anticipatory timing of 
movement in this time range functions most accurately and effortless within a window of a few 
seconds (Mates et al. 1994, McAuley et al. 2006; for an overview, see Dorato and Wittmann 
2015, Pöppel 1997). By measuring event-related potentials of the brain employing a specific 
experimental paradigm (assessing mismatch negativity), it has been shown that deviations from 
the physical characteristics of repeated stimuli lead to higher amplitudes with inter-stimulus 
intervals below 3 s than with longer intervals (Wang et al. 2015, 2016). This has been 
interpreted as indication that the brain is most sensitive to processing temporal intervals up to 
3 s. 
In our opinion, many researchers and philosophers have relied too heavily on passive 
perceptual processes and did not consider the sensorimotor basis of human activity which is 
essential for understanding consciousness. Humans most effortlessly anticipate and integrate 
                                                 
14 Edmund Husserl (1928/1991, p. 32) mentions that the temporal field must have a certain quantifiable 
duration: “which is manifestly limited, precisely as in perception’s case. Indeed, on the whole, one might dare to 
assert that the temporal field always has the same extensions.” 
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sensory events through motor behavior with intervals not expanding three seconds (Mates et al. 
1994, McAuley et al. 2006). Within this context the philosopher Andrea Roselli (2019) favors 
the extended temporal model as he defines the present as the time interval in which an individual 
can react without having the feeling of being too late. This is in essence the impression of being 
in synchrony with the world within an extended frame of sensorimotor activity. For him, if we 
can react with two temporally separate movements to two different events, these two distinct 
events are temporally separated and not within one present moment. Two events which I might 
be able to perceptually separate but which I cannot act upon separately, because the time 
interval between is too short, can be treated as co-conscious, as falling within one present 
moment. 
It is a matter of conceptual debate about empirical findings to decide whether the 
experienced moment or the feeling of ‘nowness’ stems from one temporal processing 
mechanism with a defined duration of around 2 to 3 seconds (Pöppel 1997) or whether several 
independent mechanisms with variable duration – but nevertheless in a similar range – can be 
identified (Kent 2019, White 2017). Brain imaging work points to several neural integration 
levels, measured as how long recent events influence moment-to-moment neural activity, visual 
and auditory narrative elements being used as stimuli, i.e. movie and sound clips (Hasson et al. 
2008, Lerner et al. 2011). The integration levels range from the sub-second to several-second 
range and form a hierarchy of progressively longer temporal processing windows within 
working-memory function. Moreover, these processing windows to some extent adapt to the 
rate at which information is arriving by means of temporal rescaling – within limits being 
variable in duration (Hasson et al. 2015). The processing windows do not have a fixed duration, 
but they stem from the contingencies during the integration of dispersed cell assemblies in an 
approximate time range (as discussed by Gallagher 2017a). However, not all of these temporal 
integration levels necessarily pertain to the experienced moment of conscious awareness about 
what is happening right now. Temporal integration mechanisms of the brain on several longer 
time scales have functional properties for the organism but they are not necessarily associated 
with the rather short experienced present (Lockwood 2005). The experienced moment refers to 
what is experienced as co-present in a window of ‘nowness’. This temporal window will be 
quite short, probably not more than 2 to 3 seconds, but maybe, as others have proposed even 
shorter (Kent 2019, Lockwood 2005). We propose that this form of temporal experience can be 
related to the extensional model where the acts and contents of consciousness are extended. If 
we take up the definition of “what is experienced as co-present in a window of experienced 
‘nowness’”, accordingly, the time interval to which the extensional model M3 applies must be 
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rather short. Dan Lloyd (2004, 2012) illustrates this extensional property of present experience 
with the Beatles song “Hey Jude”. As soon as Paul McCartney’s voice intones the “Hey” we 
all expect the “Jude” to come, even though the word has not yet been voiced, and it is 
(physically) not present. It is already mentally present as actualized through long-term memory 
traces. Similarly, when we hear the “Jude”, the “Hey” is still resonating with us even though, 
physically speaking, the air vibrations are no longer existent. That is, we experience a temporal 
unit of “Hey Jude” with an emphasis first on the “Hey” and then later on the “Jude”. These two 
experiences E1 and E2 are representationally speaking co-present. Thus, in this example we 
have the two extended events (contents of consciousness) “Hey” and “Jude” (E1, E2) as forming 
an experienced unit integrated by an act of consciousness.15  
In contrast, longer temporal integration mechanisms relate to the time range of the working 
memory capturing short-term memory traces related to mental presence (Wittmann 2011). 
Mental presence is a longer interval of integration for enabling the continuity of experience 
through working memory in the range of multiple seconds, thereby allowing the maintenance 
of cognitive operations and emotional feelings. The neuroscientist Goldman-Rakic (1997) 
notably described working memory as providing “a temporal bridge between events – both 
those that are internally generated and environmentally presented – thereby conferring a sense 
of unity and continuity to conscious experience”. That is why, after a short interruption, we can 
again follow up on a task we were just doing. However, the past visual experience of watching 
a movie is not co-present anymore as visual experience, when after the interruption of 10 
seconds I again follow the movie. This relates to persistent neural activity, generated during a 
short-term delay period by reverberating discharges in neural networks including the prefrontal 
cortex; this is the mechanism that keeps information over the course of multiple seconds in 
working memory (Constantinidis and Klingberg 2016). This form of temporal processing can 
be related to the retentional model with extended contents of consciousness. These contents 
show up as short-term memory traces and are not dependent on an extended mechanistic act of 
consciousness but to the slow fading out of memory (i.e. the process of forgetting). In the 
retentionalist's account experience is intentionally directed to the past, present, or future and a 
just passed event is available through working memory-type components (retentions) that are 
actualized next to momentary sensory experience in an extended perceptual presence. However, 
we see one main obstacle for accepting the retentional model, which assumes that the acts of 
                                                 
15 We are aware the Dan Lloyd uses this example in favour of the retentional model. In our opinion, shorter 
intervals are covered by the extensional model; longer intervals by the retentional model. The question would be 
whether “Hey Jude” would fit into a window of presence according to the extensional model. That is the debate. 
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consciousness are unextended. Any biological process takes time. Since we are dealing with 
brain processes which underlie acts of consciousness, we have to state that an unextended act 
of consciousness is biologically not plausible. The mechanistic basis of any act of 
consciousness necessitates an interval of time and thus is extended (Longo & Montévil 2011). 
As argued above, these considerations also apply to the cinematic model, given that both 
models share the hypothesis that the act of consciousness is unextended. Consequently, the 
arguments presented above against the claim that within the cinematic model the act is 
unextended also apply to the retentional model.  
There could nevertheless be a feasible way to circumvent the problem of making sense of 
the unextended acts of consciousness postulated by the retentional model as it is usually 
understood. One could assume passive memory processes within working memory, where just 
experienced events recede into the past without the presence of acts of consciousness. In such 
a conceptualization, longer time intervals in the content of our experience would be involved 
without an explicit mechanism for a series of unextended acts of consciousness. However, this 
move would change drastically the assumptions of the retentional model as presented above. 
Two recent conceptualizations by Northoff (2014, 2016) and by Lloyd (2004, 2012) link 
specific neural activation to James’ (1890) and Husserl’s (1928/1991) idea of “inner time 
consciousness”. In these two approaches, the question of whether act and content of 
consciousness are extended is not explicitly addressed, but a discussion of this question should 
be conducted by relating the phenomenological view of an extended present with specific neural 
processes. Northoff (2014, 2016) identifies slow cortical potentials with something that can 
potentially enable the temporal width of experience (as extended present moment) through the 
temporal integration of discrete time points. Due to their long phase duration as low-frequency 
fluctuations, such slow cortical potentials would integrate different stimuli and their associated 
neural activity from different brain regions (Schmidt et al. 2016). Such temporal integration 
across regions of the brain would enable consciousness over time, the feeling of extended 
‘nowness’. Lloyd (2004, 2012) with his empirical work employing fMRI technology identifies 
the default mode network (comprising midline structures of the brain) with temporally 
fluctuating activity, processes that might encode the flow of events over time as experienced 
temporality. 
  
4 Why do the temporal models need the addition of a predictive component? 
Our knowledge about the anticipatory and enactive character of perception and 
experience (Gallagher 2017b, Noë 2004, Varela et al., 1991/2016) presupposes the existence 
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of various inference problems that our brain constantly solves (Friston and Kiebel, 2009, 
Wacongne et al. 2011). In the context of the “predictive coding” concept (Friston 2010; for a 
precursor model see von Holst and Mittelstaedt 1950), the brain is constantly predicting what 
might happen based on prior experience and correct the expectation through a specific feedback 
mechanism (Eagleman 2011). In normal waking consciousness we are constantly making short-
term predictions in order to minimize surprise, which is defined as the difference between 
prediction and actual outcome. Surprise means that the organism has to adapt its behavior, a 
fact that in turn increases energy consumption. This is what an organism wants to avoid; 
therefore, the goal is to reduce prediction error for saving energy expenditure. If temporal 
structures recur in the environment, adequate prediction means the proactive attentional and 
motor preparation for upcoming events (Nobre and van Ede 2018). Social communication is 
about predicting and explaining the behaviors of other people as embodied interaction (Fuchs 
and de Jaegher 2009). Dynamical inter-bodily, verbal and non-verbal, interactions give rise to 
measurable synchrony patterns among individuals (Froese and Fuchs 2012, Tschacher et al. 
2012). Given the indubitably anticipatory character of our experience and its evolutionary 
evidence, it seems quite plausible to argue that the extensional and even retentional models 
endorsed in the sense given in the previous section ought to be supplemented with a predictive 
component. 
As an illustration, think of well-known, everyday life examples involving the motor 
schemas that enable us to catch a ball. In these cases, we automatically calculate the time of 
arrival and anticipate our catching the ball by moving our arm beforehand (Bar 2007). Our 
experience of the present “includes” the future event in such a way that the retained events, the 
primary impression and the anticipated event cannot be sharply separated, and differ only by 
the vivacity with which they are presented to us: this happens when we listen to music and 
anticipate a note, or when we suggest a word to someone who is speaking to us and does not 
know how to go on or finish the sentence. 
Whereas predictive coding and sensorimotor anticipation are related to the millisecond 
and second range, anticipatory components also play a role in longer temporal intervals, where 
evolutionary arguments may suggest the possibility that some brain structures piggybacked on 
the former much simpler mechanisms. We should consider the kind of information that is 
retrieved from our biographical and narrative self to be essentially goal-directed and therefore 
future-oriented as well. This seems to be required by the fact that many of our decisions, 
especially those that are not routine-like such as taking the subway or the car to go to work, 
need to be considered from the viewpoint of our “future self”, namely by anticipating now how 
  
- 23 - 
we would perceive ourselves in the future (Szpunar et al. 2014). 
This is not to be understood just in terms of the fact that these decisions require a sort of 
temporal neutrality vis à vis the present moment (see Brink 2013) and therefore considerate 
attention to working memory, more or less remote past and anticipated future. In addition, when 
our decisions are morally relevant, they also involve our consulting, filtering out and retrieving 
appropriate bits of our autobiographical self in order to find out the “kind of person we were 
and wanted to be in the past” (our past commitments) and therefore also the kind of person we 
want to become in the future. Affective asymmetries between anticipated future and past pains 
are complemented by other asymmetries: knowledge asymmetry means that we know less about 
the future than about the past; the future is open to our action while the past is settled and 
unchangeable; a causal asymmetry means that only the future is potentially controllable. These 
and other temporal biases explain why according to Callender (2017) we care more about the 
future than the past. 
It is interesting to note that a reference to extended episodic contents of time consciousness 
is also of paramount importance to explain our capacity to anticipate, experience, and remember 
an objective succession of physical events. This capacity enables us to look at the same event 
(say, our next birthday) from three different temporal perspectives even when they are separated 
by, say, months (the same event being anticipated, experienced, and then remembered). These 
projections of the self in time make possible our planning the future course of action and 
therefore rational decisions. 
However, what are the grounds for this capacity? During the experienced moment we 
integrate an objective succession of physical events by predicting, experiencing, and retaining 
events in a small interval of time spanning a few seconds. This capacity is shared by highly 
developed mammals (Gerster and Fazio 1995). However, it is the mental presence that is 
responsible for our full-fledged feeling of the flow of time across the time span of working 
memory, and within which long-term memories and long-term future expectations are 
actualized. As Augustine had already claimed, we measure the length of non-existent, future 
time by encompassing the future experience in the present experience via a distensio animi (a 
“stretching of our mind”), and then imagining how that future event will be like when it will 
become past: all of this relying on our inductive capacities. 
The role of induction in explaining the passage of time as an extension of the experienced 
present (a few seconds) and the mental present (several seconds of working memory span) is 
evident from the fact that future outcomes of our actions, when they fall outside the temporal 
scope of this twofold present, are “imagined” but not “perceived directly”. However, we must 
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not forget that the identity conditions for the continuity of a self in time necessarily involve 
future projections, based on anticipated conditions that are influenced by our past experiences. 
These projections into the future (a sort of mental time travel) are based upon long-term 
autobiographical as well as episodic memories, and their function is to form expectations of 
what might happen. Clearly this function contributes to survival and according to some it is 
even at the origin of language (Suddendorf and Corballis 2007, Yi et al. 2009). Even more 
radically, we could say that the particular information that we retrieve within the boundless 
amount of data concerning our autobiographical self depends in part on our present goals and 
therefore on what we want to achieve. Correspondingly, we interpret and filter out our past 
experiences in terms of what is occurring in the present and therefore of what we want to 
achieve in the future. 
In a word, it is only because (1) we first anticipate our future, say, sitting in the dentist 
room, an event occurring in 10 days from now, (2) we then experience the root canal treatment 
as it momentarily occurs, and finally (3) we remember the very same event a day later as past 
experience that we are capable of looking at the same event (the dentist session) from three 
different temporal mental perspectives. But this capacity is exactly what is necessary and 
sufficient for creatures like us to believe in the reality of our experience of the passage of time, 
a capacity that is already present in shorter time intervals, in the experienced present and in 
anticipations of sensory-motor mechanism. In fact, within the time constraints of experienced 
presence we directly experience the passage of time as directly felt on the scale of seconds, as 
the dentist’s drill comes closer to our mouth and then drills a hole and then again extracts his 
tool again. Also on this time scales of several seconds, a future event (the anxiously awaited 
drill while already sitting on the dentist’s chair) becomes present experience (now the drill 
enters my tooth) and later memory of what just happened (when the dentist retracts the drill out 
of my mouth). Whether this phenomenology is sufficient to attribute to the metaphysical world 
a mind-independent passage or temporal becoming is another question that here cannot be 
treated (see Prosser 2016 for a well-argued negative answer and Dorato 2019 for a critical 
review).  
 
5 Conclusion  
Here we argued specifically for the extensional model of time consciousness which, 
moreover, must contain a predictive component. Neuropsychological findings are indicative of 
cyclic brain processes which could underlie the discreteness of perceptual processing found in 
many experimental tasks. We tried to show that the acts of consciousness, – which themselves 
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have a predictive, future-directed component – as well as the contents of consciousness, as 
related to the time range of seconds, are extended as the extensional model has it. However, the 
dynamical snapshot model and the retentional model have not been definitely ruled out and 
may apply to phenomena in the millisecond and the multiple-second time range, respectively. 
Our major criticism concerning these two models is that they assume that acts of consciousness 
are unextended, which is biologically and neurophysiologically implausible. 
In this article, three issues were not discussed in detail. For one, we only scratched the 
issue of embodiment of perceptual experience pertaining to the conscious self and time. 
According to the embodied/enactive conceptualization, the first-person perspective is created 
by the continuous visceral and proprioceptive input from the body, the physical self thereby 
functioning as (bodily) anchor of subjective experience (Craig 2015, Metzinger 2008). 
Relatedly, subjective time emerges through the existence of the self across time as an enduring 
and embodied entity (Fuchs 2017, Zahavi 2005). Second, we did not elaborate on the question 
whether the passage of time is an ontological feature of the world (see the comment above 
mentioning Prosser). Thirdly, and relatedly, we did not touch upon the problem of what in 
experience accounts for the feeling of the flow of time. There is no single experience that we 
could call ‘passage of time’ or ‘flow’ (Callender 2017, p. 228f). Different experiences in the 
range of milliseconds and seconds, such as movement or change, most likely generate our belief 
in the passage of time. Moreover, on a larger time scale of expectation and autobiographical 
memory we experience the “passage of an event” through time (see our example above of 
visiting the dentist 10 days from now). 
Experienced temporality thus is dependent upon different time scales. The extensional 
model pertains to a short interval of present sensory experience which binds elements into a 
temporal, co-present and experienced whole. Experienced change and perceived movement 
extend up to a few seconds. Beyond this short time range of an experienced moment, working 
memory processes bind together events that are not immediately present in sensory experience. 
To sum up, in discussing the three models of temporal consciousness, the cinematic, the 
retentional, and the extensional model, we presented the distinction between acts of 
consciousness and contents of consciousness. In reviewing a selection of empirical findings 
from the cognitive neurosciences we showed how these models can be juxtaposed to different 
phenomena and mechanisms on different time scales. We favored an extensional model of time 
consciousness for the experienced present, i.e. a short time range of maximally very few 
seconds, where the acts and contents of consciousness are both extended. In addition, we show 
that the retentional model might apply to longer time ranges but the fact that this model 
  
- 26 - 
supposes unextended acts of consciousness makes it less plausible from a biological point of 
view. Moreover, we added a predictive component as decisive for the understanding of 
subjective time. 
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